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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether current tort law should be applied to the virtual world due
to society’s increased usage of technological advancements.
II. Whether the district court erred in denying sanctions for appellee’s
bad faith destruction of crucial evidence to appellant’s underlying
claim when traditional spoliation analysis, strong public policy and
the newly amended Marshall rules of civil procedure indicate that
sanctions should apply.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall for the
Fourth Circuit is not officially reported but appears in the Record. (R. at
3-7.) The opinion of the Cyrus County District Court is not officially reported but also appears in the Record. (R. at 3-6.)
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions appear in the appendices following this brief: Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; Fed. R. Evid. 401.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Grants of summary judgment are reviewed de novo. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A trial court’s denial of
sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Brandt v. Vulcan, 30 F.3d
752, 755 (7th Cir 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellee, Windbucket Entertainment, LLC (“Appellee”),
is a maker and publisher of multi-player online games. (R. at 4.) “Eden”
is Appellee’s most successful online game, allowing players to create a
virtual representative called an “avatar” to interact in the virtual world.
These avatars can amass virtual property in the form of land, homes,
starships, and virtual money that can be used within the game. (R. at 4,
5.) Players can also create their own communities and conduct businesses to trade their Eden property. (R. at 4.) Appellee requires that
each player agree to the Eden Terms of Use Agreement before playing
the game. According to the Terms of Use Agreement, players “hold expectations of privacy in their conduct and affairs conducted in the
Game.” (R. at 9.)
Plaintiff-Appellant, Alex Romero (“Appellant”), lives in the State of
Marshall and is an Eden subscriber. (R. at 5.) Appellant “has invested a
significant amount of time and money in running his online life,” developing a gated community for himself and his invitees. (R. at 5.) By creating this gated community, Appellant sought to conduct his private
affairs from within the seclusion of his virtual mansion. (R. at 5.)
To participate in Eden, players pay a fee of $15 per month. (R. at 4.)
Due to the competitive nature of the online gaming industry, Appellee
has experimented with a number of special features to promote subscriber retention and to generate profits. (R. at 4.) One of these special
features was Zero Being mode, which penalized subscribers with delinquent accounts by making their avatars invisible. (R. at 4.) Rather than
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pay the reinstatement fee, many subscribers intentionally withheld payment to become invisible. (R. at 4.) They created an independent website entitled “Zombies of Eden” where they would post their observations
of other subscribers’ actions within the game. (R. at 4.) After learning of
the website and the intentional non-payment, Appellee discontinued
Zero Being mode in July 2006. (R. at 4.)
Another feature was called “Voyage Enhanced Unrecognizability”
mode (“Voyeur mode”). (R. at 4.) In Voyeur mode, avatars were invisible
and could travel to any location within Eden, including otherwise restricted areas, instantaneously. (R. at 4.) Consequently, Voyeur mode
allowed select avatars to spy on the private conduct and affairs of other
Eden gamers. (R. at 4.) Appellee profited from permitting individuals to
spy on other Eden gamers by charging an extra monthly fee for Voyeur
mode. (R. at 4.) However, in November 2007, Appellee suspended
Voyeur mode indefinitely after receiving “numerous complaints” from
subscribers and citing “policy concerns.” (R. at 5.)
In July 2006, an Eden subscriber known only by the avatar name
“LEETDUDE” purchased Voyeur mode from Appellee (R. at 5.) On or
before November 30, 2007, LEETDUDE posted numerous images consisting of screen shots captured from his game sessions in Voyeur mode
to the Zombies of Eden site. (R. at 5.) Two of these screen shots were of
Appellant’s conduct and affairs within the game. One was a screen shot
of the bedroom of Appellant’s private online mansion. (R. at 5.) The
other was a picture of six or seven avatars, one of which appears to be
Appellant, engaged in sexual acts within Appellant’s virtual curtilage.
(R. at 5.) To the best of Appellant’s knowledge and belief, both of these
areas were restricted to himself and his invited guests. (R. at 5.)
Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee and LEETDUDE on
December 27, 2007, along with a discovery request seeking the identity
of LEETDUDE. (R. at 5.) When Appellee denied knowing the identity of
LEETDUDE, Appellant submitted a second discovery request, asking for
the server authentication logs of September, October and November
2007, in order to discover LEETDUDE’s internet protocol address and
identity. (R. at 6.) At this time in January 2007, when Appellant submitted the discovery request, Appellee’s Data Retention Policy did not
indicate that the logs were routinely deleted, stating only that “older logs
may be pruned.” (R. at 14.) When Appellee refused to produce the authentication logs, Appellant obtained a court order to compel production.
(R. at 6.) Not once, not twice, but three times Appellee flaunted the
court’s authority by producing inadequate responses, if it responded at
all. (R. at 13.) Only when the District Court ordered Appellee to turn
over the logs or show cause for its failure to do so did Appellee produce a
new, more favorable Data Retention Policy, drafted merely two days earlier, on February 2, 2008. The new Data Retention Policy provides that

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\26-2\SFT202.txt

290

unknown

Seq: 8

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

21-AUG-09

8:47

[Vol. XXVI

“[t]he current month and previous months of logs are available as raw
log files in the server data directory.” (R. at 13.) Both the new and old
policies expressly state that the logs in question are actively “used for
diagnosing customer issues as well as tracking server utilization,” as opposed to the general web site data which is “not considered a generally
available archive, [used only] in the event of a catastrophic systems failure.” (R. at 13.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 27, 2007, Appellant filed a complaint for invasion of
privacy in the Cyrus County District Court against Appellee and LEETDUDE, in case number 07 CV 5309. (R. at 3.) Appellant also filed a
motion for sanctions based on Appellee’s spoliation of evidence and failure to comply with court ordered discovery. (R. at 6.) The District Court
entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee and
denying Appellant’s motion for sanctions, but ordered Appellee to pay
reasonable expenses incurred as a result of its failure to obey discovery
orders. (R. at 3.)
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall
for the Fourth Circuit, under case number 4-08-0315, on two bases. (R.
at 3.) First, Appellant sought reversal of the District Court’s award of
summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. Second, Appellant contended the
District Court erred in denying his motion for sanctions pursuant to
Marshall Rules of Civil Procedure (“MRCP”) 37.1 (R. at 3, 6.) On June
16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court on both issues.
(R. at 7.) On the first issue, the court declined to hold that a fictional
avatar in a virtual world could be a victim of an intrusion upon seclusion.
(R. at 7.) On the second issue, the court held that because Appellant did
not suffer an actionable tort, the District Court’s denial of sanctions was
harmless. (R. at 7.) On July 7, 2008, the Supreme Court of the State of
Marshall granted Appellant’s leave to appeal. (R. at 2.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Honorable Court should reverse the decision of the State of
Marshall Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Cyrus County
District Court because the courts erred in their failure to recognize a
cognizable claim of intrusion upon seclusion. Appellee created an expectation of privacy grounded in the Terms of Use Agreement. Appellant’s
affirmative steps to seclude his private affairs within Eden were consis1. “The Marshall Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to this matter are identical in all
relevant respects to the corresponding provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
(R. at 3.)
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tent with an actual expectation of privacy. Because of these affirmative
steps and the humiliation caused by the intrusion, it was highly offensive as defined in case law. Further, this Court has the opportunity to
evolve the right to privacy, within the common law, to account for wrongs
unique to the technology of today. Appellee is liable for the invasion of
privacy under a contributing tortfeasor theory; but for the actions of Appellee, Appellant’s privacy would not have been intruded upon.
Also, the District Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s
motion for sanctions when Appellee destroyed crucial electronic evidence
in bad faith. Moreover, Appellee’s refusal to comply with repeated requests and orders for discovery ruined Appellant’s ability to seek full judicial relief against LEETDUDE. The court should have either awarded
default judgment or taken Appellee’s liability as established because
those remedies were warranted under traditional sanctions analysis and
for historically recognized reasons of specific deterrence, general deterrence and to prevent Appellee’s unjust enrichment. Moreover, the newly
enacted MRCP 37 provides Appellee no refuge from sanctions because
Appellee’s self-interested and bad faith spoliation does not reach sufficient merit to warrant protection under the rule and interpreting case
law.
ARGUMENT
I. THE INTRUSION ON APPELLANT’S REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WAS HIGHLY OFFENSIVE TO A
REASONABLE PERSON, THEREBY IMPOSING LIABILITY ONTO
APPELLEE FOR INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
Marshall Courts have consistently recognized that a cause of action
lies for an invasion of privacy under § 652B of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. (R. at 7.) In order to succeed on an intrusion upon seclusion
claim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, (2) there was an intrusion (physical or otherwise)
into the personal affairs or concerns of the plaintiff, and (3) a reasonable
person would find the intrusion to be highly offensive. Restatement (Second) Torts § 652B (1979).2
Appellee, having satisfied all the requisite elements for intrusion
upon seclusion, is liable for intruding upon Appellant’s seclusion. First,
Appellee’s Terms of Use Agreement expressly states that users of the
game “may hold expectations of privacy in their conduct and affairs conducted in the Game.” (R. at 9.) Second, Appellee intruded upon Appel2. See Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir.
2000). The Eight Circuit recognizes the exact 3 elements as necessary to sustain a successful cause of action under Restatement (Second) Torts § 876(b).
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lant’s private affairs when it created and surreptitiously disseminated
Voyeur mode. This dissemination enabled LEETDUDE to gain unauthorized access to Appellant’s virtual community and expropriate personal
information. Finally, Appellee’s blatant disregard for the users’ rights to
privacy, coupled with LEETDUDE’S subsequent violation of Appellant’s
expectation of privacy, is conduct that a reasonable person would find
highly offensive.
As the virtual world continues to develop and integrate with numerous aspects of the real world,3 the law must adapt to accommodate the
increased litigation arising from actions commenced within the virtual
world. Id. In declining to uphold the viability of intrusion upon seclusion claims arising out of the virtual world, the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment reflects an archaic perception and stagnant application of the law that is inconsistent with society’s current perception of
virtual worlds. Because Appellee is liable for intrusion upon seclusion,
this Court must reverse the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
A. APPELLANT POSSESSED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN
HIS AFFAIRS CONDUCTED IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD BASED ON CONTRACT
THEORY, THE EXCLUSIONARY NATURE OF APPELLANT’S ACTIONS, AND THE
PROGRESSIVE APPLICATION OF THE INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION TORT
1. Appellee’s Terms of Use Agreement Contractually Provided
Participants in Eden With a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
in Their Conduct and Affairs Conducted in the Virtual World.
The right to privacy is not derived solely from the traditional statutory and common law constructs; rather, this right may also be created
through contractual agreements. In support of this proposition, the First
Circuit held that an employer violated an employee’s right to privacy
when it disclosed the employee’s psychiatric evaluation in direct violation of the parties’ contractual agreement that prohibited such disclosures. Bratt v. IBM Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 355 (1st Cir. 1986).4 Similarly,
a California appellate court held that an employer’s written policy state3. Avatars have been used to provide valuable real-world services such as psychotherapy, teaching, and conducting electronic commerce. Woodrom Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the Right of Owners, Programmers and
Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649, 656 (2006).
4. See also In re Eli Lily & Co., No. 012 3214 (F.T.C. January 18, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/elililly.htm. (Pharmaceutical company liable for disclosing
sensitive medical information of 669 customers when it promised the information would be
kept confidential. “Companies that obtain sensitive information in exchange for a promise
to keep it confidential must take appropriate steps to ensure the security of that information.”) . Id.
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ment prohibiting inquiries into employees’ personal lives granted the
employees a contractual right to privacy. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp.,
162 Cal. App. 3d 241 (Cal. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Guz
v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. App. 2000). In applying traditional contract doctrines to online contracts, the courts have enforced online terms of use agreements where the users had an opportunity to
review and consent to the agreement. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732
A.2d 528 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1999); see also Groff v. America Online, Inc., No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001, at *4 (R.I. Super. 1998 May
27, 1998) (holding that terms of use agreements can constitute valid
contracts).
Given the courts’ widespread recognition and enforcement of terms
of use agreements, this Court should acknowledge Appellant’s contractual right to privacy. Appellee’s Terms of Use Agreement specifically
states that users of the game “may hold expectations of privacy in their
conduct and affairs conducted in the [g]ame.” (R. at 9.) The express
terms of this clause are directly analogous to the provisions in Bratt and
Rulon-Miller that established an expectation of privacy. Furthermore,
as in Caspi, the Appellant’s assent to the Terms of Use Agreement established a valid and enforceable contract.
2. Appellant’s Conduct in the Virtual World was Consistent With an
Actual Expectation of Privacy
“The right to privacy is an integral part of our humanity; one has a
public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded and
preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives
shall become public and which parts we shall hold close.” Lake v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). Recognizing this
dichotomy, courts have held that a determining factor in intrusion upon
seclusion cases is whether the plaintiff conducted himself in a manner
that is consistent with an actual expectation of privacy. Hill v. NCAA,
869 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994). More specifically, “a person’s behavior
may not give rise to an inference that he no longer expects to maintain
privacy in some aspects of his affairs.” Id.
Whether a person’s behavior demonstrates an expectation of privacy
is determined by the presence, or lack thereof, of affirmative actions designed to restrict access to his private affairs and information. As the
court noted in Four Navy Seals v. AP, merely intending for limited people to have access to information, without affirmative restrictive actions,
does not support possessing a reasonable expectation of privacy. 413 F.
Supp. 2d 1136, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2005). In this case, the Navy Seals took
photographs of themselves interacting with war prisoners and sent them
to the spouse of one of the participants. Upon receipt of the photographs,
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the spouse posted them on a non-restricted website that was open to the
general online public. Given the absence of prerequisites to gain access
(e.g. requiring a password or subscription) to the photos, the court concluded that the posting of the photos online dissolved any expectation of
privacy. Id.; see also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30
F.Supp.2d 1182, 1188 (D. Ariz. 1998) (holding that laboratory owner had
no expectation of privacy due to his failure to affirmatively communicate
that he expected the conversation to be private and take subsequent precautions to ensure privacy).
While failure to take affirmative action can result in dissolving an
expectation of privacy, this expectation may also be destroyed by affirmative acts. In Fletcher, a deli worker, upon learning that she had a staph
infection, immediately disclosed her medical condition to two of her coworkers. 220 F.2d at 874. Although a person’s medical condition generally is considered private information, the court held that the plaintiff’s
“revelation of private information eliminated her expectation of privacy
by making what was formerly private a topic of office conversation.” Id.
at 878. As such, the court denied plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion
claim. Id. at 879. Similarly, in Cheatham v. Paisano Publ’ns Inc., a
clothing designer brought an intrusion upon seclusion claim resulting
from the publication of a picture displaying her bottom through fishnet
fabric patches on jeans she wore at biker events. 891 F.Supp. 381, 384
(W.D. Ky. 1995). In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the court stated that
wearing her designs in public was inconsistent with possessing an actual
expectation of privacy. Id. at 385.
While the courts have steadfastly rejected intrusion upon seclusion
claims where the plaintiff has engaged in some act inconsistent with
maintaining an expectation of privacy, they have consistently found for
plaintiffs who took affirmative steps towards securing their right to privacy. In Doe v. P.P.S Guard Servs. Inc., security guards used a surveillance camera to watch and video tape fashion show models changing
their wardrobe behind a curtained dressing area. 945 F.2d 1422, 1424
(8th Cir. 1991). Despite the general accessibility to the secluded area for
many members involved in the show, the court held that creating a curtained dressing area was consistent with a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 1427. See also Leventhal v. Knapek, 366 F.3d 64, 73-74 (2d
Cir. 2001) (employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in office
computer because he was the only one that had access to the computer
and did not allow others to use it). As the California Supreme Court
noted in Sanders v. ABC, “privacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is
not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that
the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute
does not render the expectation unreasonable.” 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal.
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1999). Additionally, the court noted that “the mere fact that a person
can be seen by some people does not mean that they can be legally forced
to be subject to being seen by everyone.” Id.
Applying the law to the case at hand, Appellant conducted himself in
a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy by taking
steps within the game of Eden to ensure that his private online domain
would be accessible only to invitees. Like the curtained dressing room in
Doe and the private office in Leventhal, Appellant’s virtual gated community established a zone of privacy for conduct occurring within that barrier. Furthermore, the fact that Appellant’s seclusion was not absolute,
as in Doe, does not diminish his expectation of privacy to be free from
unwanted intruders. While the plaintiffs in Fletcher, Navy Seals, and
Cheatham destroyed their expectations of privacy by exposing private
matters to the general public, Appellant shielded his affairs from the virtual public eye by secluding himself within his gated community. Appellant easily could have engaged in sexual conduct outside of his secluded
community; however, he chose to hold that part of his virtual life close.
Consequently, Appellant created a reasonable expectation to privacy in
his online affairs.
3. Ever-Increasing Technological Advances Warrant Progressive
Development of Common Law to Recognize Torts Occurring in
the Virtual World
Civilization has progressed far beyond the days when typewriters
and rotary telephones represented the height of communication technology. The “strength of our legal system lies in its elasticity, adaptability,
capacity for growth and ability to meet the wants of an ever changing
society and to apply immediate relief for every recognized wrong.” Lake,
582 N.W.2d at 234. Consequently, the lower courts’ failure to expand the
application of intrusion upon seclusion to virtual environments contradicts the strong historical trend favoring expanding the applicable scope
of this tort to account for new developments.
As society changes over time, the common law must also evolve. . . . It
must be remembered that the common law is the result of growth and
that its development has been determined by the social needs of the
community which governs it. . . . Manifestly, it must change as society
changes and new rights are recognized; otherwise the law ceases to be
effective.” Id.

Despite the considerable advancements in communication technology, society has continued to adhere to the notion that “[i]t is the legal
right of every man to enjoy social and business relations with his friends,
neighbors, and acquaintances, and he is entitled to converse with them
without molestation by intruders.” Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47
(Ky. Ct. App. 1931).
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The genesis for recognizing invasion of privacy torts has often been
attributed to the seminal Harvard Law Review article, “The Right to Privacy” written by Justices Warren and Brandeis. Louis D. Brandeis &
Samuel D. Warren, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890)
[hereinafter Brandeis]. Because recent technological advancements5
produced increases in privacy invasions, Warren and Brandeis stated
that the law must evolve to protect individuals’ “right to be let alone” and
provide a remedy when this right has been violated. Id. Shortly thereafter, the development and use of wiretaps caused the courts to re-evaluate
the scope of the right to privacy. Rhodes, 37 S.W. 2d at 47. Because the
courts were of the impression that wiretapping did not involve property
or contractual rights, there was widespread disagreement as to the applicability of invasion of privacy torts. Id. In expanding the scope of invasion of privacy torts, the court concluded that “[t]he evil incident to the
invasion of privacy of the telephone is as great as that occasioned by unwarranted publicity in newspapers and by other means of a man’s private affairs for which courts have granted the injured person redress. Id.
As technology continued to provide more avenues for invading the
privacy of others, Congress and the courts took affirmative action to ensure the protection of individuals’ right to privacy. In United States v.
Councilman, the court addressed whether the Wiretap Act (amended
and renamed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act) applied to email communications that were intercepted, copied, and electronically
stored. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 70-71 (1st Cir. 2005).
The defendant asserted that Congress deemed computer communication
less worthy of protection because users had a lower expectation of privacy. Id. The court rejected the defendant’s arguments finding that his
interpretation of the Wiretap Act was inconsistent with congressional intent. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 70-71. In support of its conclusion, the
court noted that Congress drafted the ECPA amendments to the Wiretap
Act specifically to account for the rise in computer communications and
corresponding threats to privacy that extended well beyond the original
scope of the Wiretap Act. Id. at 80.6 Furthermore, when Congress initially passed the ECPA in 1986, the Act excluded cordless telephone conversations from being encompassed within the definition of electronic
communication. Id. at 75. In recognition that this exclusion no longer fit
with the significant advances in technology and society’s privacy expectations, the legislature repealed the cordless phone exclusion eight years
after its enactment. Id. at 72 n.11.
5. i.e. instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises
6. See also In Re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that the
“ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act by extending to data and electronic transmissions the same protection already afforded to oral and wire communications.” ).
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As scholars have observed, “the boundaries between the game space
and real space are permeable. Things that happen to people in the game
space can have real-world effects.” Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 Va.
L. Rev. 2043, 2059 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin]. 7 Recently, virtual world
property has attained significant real world value.8 Many gamers have
begun to sell their virtual world property or powers for real world currency. Balkin, at 2059-60. As a byproduct of this blurred separation,
portions of the regulation and protection of virtual environments are being governed by real world law. Because of the substantial growth in the
interplay between the real and virtual worlds, the creators of Second Life
granted intellectual property rights to players for the virtual content
they created in the virtual world. Bragg v. Linden Research Inc., 487
F.Supp.2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007).9 In a 2003 case involving a hacker’s
expropriation of a player’s online property, a Chinese court recognized
that real world tort law applied to virtual world torts. Balkin, at 2067
(citing Lawsuit Fires Up in Case of Vanishing Virtual Weapons, China
Daily, Nov. 20, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/
doc/2003-11/20/content_283094.htm). Additionally, the Chinese court
held the game manufacturer tortiously liable because it refused to identify the hacker who committed the theft. Id.
“The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world . . . [as
such,] solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual.” Brandeis, at 196. In today’s exposure driven society, many people
find virtual worlds as a refuge for their privacy. In light of society’s increased recognition of virtual worlds and the recent recognition of various online rights, the lower court erroneously denied Appellant’s claim.

7. See also Woodrom Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments:
Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 29 AKRON L. REV.
649 (2006) (discussing the increased use of virtual avatars for providing real world services
in the virtual world).
8. An average World of Warcraft gamer will spend over 350 hours to advance his or
her avatar to the highest level. This roughly equates to nine weeks of work at a full time
job. See David Shelton, Claiming Ownership, But Getting Owned: Contractual Limitations
on Asserting Property Interests in Virtual Goods, 54 UCLA L. REV 751, 761 (2007).
9. Second Life is a popular online role playing game where participants are able to
communicate with others and encounter many experiences that mirror those in the real
world. Even Judge Posner has made an appearance in Second Life as a balding,
bespectacled cartoon rendering of himself where he addressed a crowd on a range of legal
issues including property rights in virtual reality. Id. at 595 n.4.
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B. APPELLEE INTRUDED UPON APPELLANT’S SECLUSION BY COVERTLY
CREATING AND DISTRIBUTING VOYEUR MODE, THEREBY SUBSTANTIALLY
ASSISTING SELECT GAMERS IN INVADING OTHERS’ PRIVATE
VIRTUAL WORLDS
1. LEETDUDE Intruded Upon Appellant’s Seclusion When He
Entered and Photographed Appellant’s Online Domain
To have an action for intrusion upon seclusion, it must be shown
that the intrusion was intentional. The Restatement defines intent to
mean “that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that
he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from
it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8 (1979). Thus, an intentional intrusion is committed if a person believes, or is substantially certain, that
they do not have the necessary legal or personal permission to commit
the intrusive act. See, e.g., Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 876 and O’Donnell v.
United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989).
The intrusion in an action for intrusion upon seclusion need not be
physical. Non-physical intrusions, such as taking photographs, are central in the Restatement’s examples of intrusion upon seclusion.10 The
overseeing or overhearing of private affairs or the investigation or examination of private concerns constitutes an intrusion upon seclusion. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b (1977). The opening of
personal correspondence in Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir.
1976), intruding into a private relationship in Moffett v. Glick, 621 F.
Supp. 244, 283 (N.D. Ind. 1985), and the monitoring of e-mail correspondence in Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL
2066746, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004), have all been considered or stipulated to be intrusions upon seclusion.
Within his private world, Appellant intended his communications
within his private community to be personal and undiscoverable. Analogous to the sealed letters in Vernars, Appellant’s gated community was
designed to prevent unauthorized access to his private affairs and communications. Furthermore, the private nature of Appellant’s relationship is directly analogous to the employee’s personal relationship in
Moffett. Absent a change to the Terms of Use Agreement, LEETDUDE
lacked the legal permission to bypass the rules of conduct and intrude on
Appellant’s private domain. Furthermore, like the defendant in Vernars,
LEETDUDE did not have personal authorization or legal permission to
intrude into Appellant’s online privacy. Finally, in order to gain access
to Appellant’s private online domain, LEETDUDE had to consciously en10. Taking pictures through a telescopic lens of another person’s bedroom interior, and
photographing a sick woman in the hospital over her objections are both examples of an
intentional intrusion. Id. at illus. 1 & 2.
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able Voyeur mode. Because LEETDUDE’s purpose in using Voyeur
mode was to secretly obtain information on other Eden gamers, his conduct satisfies the intentional requirement set forth in the Restatement.
2. Appellee is Liable to Appellant as a Contributing Tortfeasor for
Giving Substantial Assistance to LEETDUDE in Accomplishing
His Invasion of Appellant’s Privacy
Contributing tortfeasors are liable for the tortious conduct of another resulting in harm to a third party if they (1) know that the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and (2) give substantial assistance
in conducting the breach. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979).
Additionally, the Restatement comments state that “[i]f the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort,
the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other’s act.” Id. at cmt. b.
Where a defendant’s actions are the proximate cause of an invasion
of privacy, case law dictates that the defendant be held liable under a
contributing tortfeasor theory. In Russell v. Marboro Books, the defendant was held tortiously liable for a third party’s libelous publication of
altered photographs of the plaintiff. 18 Misc. 2d 166, 187 (N.Y. 1959).
The court imposed liability on the defendant because its sale of the negatives to a third party was the proximate cause of the libelous conduct.
Id. “The general rule is that if the probable result of an act is injury to
another, the actor cannot escape liability merely because his act was not
the immediate cause of the injury, if the intervening cause was foreseen
or reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 187. In California, a publisher was
held liable for publishing an advertisement that caused an invasion of
privacy. Vescovo v. New Way Enters., Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 588 (Cal.
App. 1976). The publisher ran an advertisement describing the mother
of a household as a “sexy bored housewife.” Id. In response to the ad,
many “unsavory characters” intruded on plaintiff’s seclusion by showing
up at her home. Id. Despite not directly invading the plaintiff’s right to
privacy, the court held that but for the defendant’s publication of the
advertisement, the plaintiff’s right to privacy would have remained intact. Vescovo, 60 Cal App. 3d, at 587.
In the case before the Court, Appellee’s assistance to LEETDUDE
was a substantial factor in the intrusion upon Appellant’s seclusion. As
in Russell and Vescovo, but for Appellee’s actions, LEETDUDE would
have been unable to enter the restricted areas of Appellant’s private online domain. Appellee’s creation of Voyeur mode allowed LEETDUDE to
become invisible to other avatars and instantaneously travel to any point
within Eden, including areas specifically designated as private by other
subscribers. Because Appellee was the author of the Terms of Use
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Agreement, it knew, or should have known, that this feature would enable other users to violate the Terms of Use Agreement, thereby breaching its duty to Appellant. Without Appellee’s assistance, Appellant’s
privacy would not have been invaded.
C. A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD FIND APPELLEE’S CONDUCT HIGHLY
OFFENSIVE BECAUSE APPELLEE GUARANTEED GAMERS CERTAIN PRIVACY
RIGHTS AND THEN INTENTIONALLY DISREGARDED THOSE RIGHTS
The Restatement requires that the invasion of privacy be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B
(1977). In applying the reasonable person standard, courts have held
that an intrusion into the personal affairs of another is highly offensive.
Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Foster Ins. Co., No. 96-8481 1997 LEXIS 6383
(E.D. Pa. May 6, 1997) (holding that an employer’s monitoring of employee’s private phone calls was highly offensive). In Hamberger v. Eastman, the court held that a landlord’s installation of a recording device in
his tenants’ bedroom was a highly offensive intrusion. 106 N.H. 107, 111
(N.H. 1964). The court further stated that intrusions into the “intimate
details of the life of one who has never manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the public,” are highly offensive. Id. Additionally,
intrusion upon seclusion has been found to be highly offensive where the
information disclosed would have caused, “mental suffering, shame, or
humiliation to a person or ordinary sensibilities.” McGuire v. Shubert,
722 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). The McGuire court concluded
that the defendant’s intrusion into plaintiff’s bank account was so humiliating that it rose to the level of being highly offensive. Id.; see also Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973) (holding that
wiretapping was highly offensive due to the humiliating nature of the
act).
Conversely when information may be obtained through other nonintrusive and readily available methods, courts have held that intrusive
acquisition is not highly offensive. Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250
(Kan. 1985). In Werner, a husband had his wife’s doctor write a note to
the trial court disclosing that his wife attempted suicide and demonstrated suicidal behavior while in the midst of the child custody proceedings. The court held that since there was nothing in the letter that was
not already known by the husband, the information revealed did not rise
to the level of being highly offensive to a reasonable person. Similarly,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found that
a reporter’s uploading of digital photographs from a website that was
available to the general public did not constitute highly offensive conduct. Four Navy Seals, 413 F. Supp. at 1145.
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In contrast to the Werner and Four Navy Seals, the information that
Appellee enabled LEETDUDE to acquire from the Eden game was not
accessible to the general public. Appellant never manifested any desire
to have publicity thrust upon his private online domain. In fact, he intended just the opposite, spending a “significant amount of time and
money” creating an area within Eden for himself and select guests of his
choosing only. (R. at 5.) Furthermore, Appellant’s interaction with his
fellow avatars, within his private community, paralleled the intimate nature of the communications in Duff Supply Co. and Hamberger. Thus, in
accordance with Hamberger, LEETDUDE’s unauthorized entrance into
Appellant’s virtual community and private affairs was highly offense.
Appellant, in spending a significant amount of time in Eden, has
established a pre-eminent reputation within this virtual world. Consequently, LEETDUDE’S posting will seriously injure Appellant’s online
reputation and cause Appellant to suffer humiliation and mental suffering, analogous to the plaintiffs in McGuire and Billings. Because of the
resulting humiliation and suffering, LEETDUDE’S intentional intrusion
is highly offensive to the reasonable person. Thus, this Court should reinstate Appellant’s intrusion upon seclusion claim.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT FOR
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND AWARD SANCTIONS UNDER RULE
37 FOR APPELLEE’S BAD FAITH SPOLIATION OF CRUCIAL
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN DEFIANCE OF REPEATED
DISCOVERY REQUESTS AND COURT ORDERS
One “central tenet” of the adversarial process is the obligatory “selfreporting” and disclosure of information “relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action.” Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., No. 98-C7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000). This duty to selfreport all relevant non-privileged evidence frequently requires parties to
disclose information that is adverse to their interest in the litigation.
When a party defies this obligation, by spoliating evidence, it “strikes at
the core of our civil litigation system.” Id.
Spoliation is the “destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or
the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending
or reasonably foreseeable litigation.” West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). A party who spoliates evidence
and, as a result, fails to comply with an order compelling discovery of
that evidence is subject to sanctions under MRCP 37(b).11 See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 249 F.R.D. 111, 11911. “The Marshall Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to this matter are identical in all
relevant respects to the corresponding provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
(R. at 3.)
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20 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Appropriate sanctions for this violation include, inter alia, “any order that is just,” in addition to default judgment against
the disobedient party and designating certain facts be taken as established, as the prevailing party claims. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207
(1958); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(a)(i) & (vi).
A party may be entitled to an award of sanctions regardless of
whether that party wins its underlying claim. The Tenth Circuit has
held that “the imposition of sanctions depends not on who wins the lawsuit, but on how the parties conduct themselves during the litigation.”
Beilue v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 492, 13 Fed. Appx. 810, 813
(10th Cir. 2001). In fashioning a remedy for such conduct, courts apply
the long recognized maxim of Sir T. Willes Chitty, “omnia presumuntur
contra spoliatorem,” or, in modern verbiage, all things are presumed
against a spoliator. West, 167 F.3d at 778. As the Second Circuit has
expressly directed, spoliation sanctions should be imposed diligently (1)
to deter parties from engaging in spoliation, (2) to place the risk of erroneous judgment on the party who created the risk, and (3) to restore the
prejudiced party to the place he would have been absent the spoliation of
evidence. Id. at 779.
A lower court’s refusal to impose sanctions is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Brandt v. Vulcan, 30 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 1994). “Generally, in the context of Rule 37 sanctions, a district court abuses its discretion when it makes a mistake of fact or law.” United States v. $49,000
Currency, 330 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2003). Because of the overwhelming evidence that Appellee willfully shirked its duty to preserve its authentication logs out of self-interest, the lower court clearly abused its
discretion by failing to order sanctions in conformity with longstanding
legal principles of punishment, general and specific deterrence, and justice to the prejudiced party. Moreover, this brief will show that sanctions
were warranted under the three traditional spoliation elements, that
only default judgment or taking Appellee’s liability as established will
suffice as a remedy, and that Appellee has no safe harbor under the
newly amended electronic discovery rules. In order to hold Appellee accountable and to bring justice to Appellant, this Court should hold that
the lower court abused its discretion and order a default judgment
against Appellee, or in the alternative, direct that Appellee’s participation in the invasion of privacy be taken as established for purposes of the
underlying action.
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A. SANCTIONS ARE WARRANTED UNDER TRADITIONAL THREE-PRONGED
SPOLIATION ANALYSIS BECAUSE APPELLEE SHIRKED ITS DUTY TO
PRESERVE CRUCIAL EVIDENCE WITH A HIGHLY CULPABLE
STATE OF MIND
To warrant the imposition of sanctions against a spoliator under the
MRCP, the prejudiced party must show these three elements: (1) that
the party accused of the spoliation had a duty to preserve evidence at the
time it was destroyed; (2) that the evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and (3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant in
such a way that a reasonable trier of fact could determine that it would
support a party’s claim or defense. See Residential Funding Corp. v.
DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002); accord Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake IV”)
and Thompson v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D.
93, 101 (D. Md. 2003). This standard applies when a party is seeking
any form of sanctions for SPOLIATION, not just an adverse inference jury
instruction. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220; accord Sampson v. City of
Cambridge, No. WDQ-06-1819, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53003, at *16-17
(D. Md. Apr. 30, 2008).
1. Appellee Had a Duty to Preserve the November 2007 Logs at the
Time They Were Destroyed
The duty to preserve evidence for litigation is more than “a passive
obligation.” Danis, 2000 WL 1694325, at *29-30. As a general rule, parties have an active obligation to place a litigation hold on any relevant
information within their control whenever litigation becomes reasonably
foreseeable, even when that evidence is only useful to an adversary. See
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 and Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines,
Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). If a party fails to preserve such
evidence while under a duty to do so and is later ordered to produce that
evidence in discovery, sanctions under MRCP 37(b) are appropriate because the inability to comply “was self-inflicted.” Chan v. Triple 8 Palace, Inc., No. 03CIV6048, 2005 WL 1925579, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,
2005); see also Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510
(D. Md. 2005) (stating that “a failure to preserve documents and records,
once the duty to do so has been triggered, raises the issue of spoliation of
evidence.”). In determining whether there was a duty to preserve certain
information, courts make a twofold inquiry into when the duty triggered
and what information is covered within its scope. Zubulake IV, 220
F.R.D. at 216.
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The Logs Were Destroyed After the Duty to Preserve Had Triggered

The duty to preserve evidence often attaches before a formal complaint is filed, triggering whenever a party “reasonably should know that
the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.” Silvestri v. GM
Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Mary Kay Brown, Digital Dangers: A Primer on Electronic Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 74
Pa. B.A. Q. 1, 4 (2003) (citing nine cases to illustrate the growing judicial
trend of the duty triggering prior to the complaint). In Zubulake IV, the
court found that the duty to preserve electronic evidence triggered four
months before the complaint was actually filed, because “the relevant
people at [the defendant company] anticipated litigation” in April before
the complaint was filed in August. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217. The
court was unwilling to consider a finding that the trigger date was any
later than the date the complaint was filed. Id. The court held that
“[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to
ensure the preservation of relevant documents.” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D.
at 218; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note.
Like the defendant company in Zubulake IV, Appellee had a duty to
enact a litigation hold when Appellee began to anticipate litigation,
which was far in advance of the filing of any complaint. This Court
should find that the duty to preserve triggered in November of 2007,
when Appellee demonstrated that it believed that Voyeur mode could
lead to future litigation. Around that same time, LEETDUDE posted the
tortious screen shots on the Zombies of Eden website, which Appellee
monitored. Within weeks, Appellee was flooded with complaints about
Voyeur mode and proceeded to shut it down, citing “policy concerns.” (R.
at 5.)
Moreover, like the Zubulake IV court, this Court should be equally
unwilling to consider a trigger date any later than the date the complaint
was filed—December 27, 2007—when Appellant simultaneously filed a
complaint against Appellee and LEETDUDE, and served Appellee with a
discovery request seeking the identity of LEETDUDE. (R. at 5.) According to Appellee’s most recent Data Retention Policy, at least the November authentication logs were in existence as of the date of the complaint
and therefore should have been preserved when the duty triggered.
However, case law supports a finding that the duty to preserve the logs
triggered in November, which would have required Appellee to preserve
at least the October and November logs as requested.
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ii. The Logs Were Within the Scope of What Should Have Been
Preserved
While not “every shred of paper” must be preserved, Zubulake IV,
220 F.R.D. at 217, the duty to preserve evidence for anticipated litigation
embraces “any information relevant to the claims or defenses of any
party, or which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the litigation.” Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 510. Generally, a litigation hold does not
apply to inaccessible data compilations that are maintained “solely for
the purpose of disaster recovery.” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218. But,
on the other hand, accessible data compilations that are actively used for
information retrieval are subject to the litigation hold and must be preserved. Id.
The server authentication logs for the months of September, October, and November 2007 were within the scope of the duty to preserve
evidence because they were relevant to the claims of Appellant and were
accessible. These logs would provide LEETDUDE’s identity and enable
Appellant to join LEETDUDE as co-defendant. Moreover, even according to Appellee’s most recent Data Retention Policy drafted admittedly
during litigation, Appellee concedes that the “internet game server traffic logs” are “used for diagnosing customer issues as wells as tracking
server utilization,” proving that the logs are, in fact, “accessible” and
subject to preservation. Thus, the logs were within the attachment and
scope of the duty to preserve evidence, which satisfies the first element of
the spoliation claim.
2. Appellee’s Destruction of the Logs Was at Least Grossly Negligent,
Which Meets the Culpability of Mind Prong
Appellee had the culpable state of mind required for a spoliation of
evidence claim. There are three states of mind that satisfy the culpability requirement: bad faith, gross negligence and ordinary negligence.
Sampson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53003, at *18. Essentially, a showing
that the spoliator was at fault for the loss of the evidence is sufficient to
warrant sanctions under this inquiry. Langley by Langley v. Union Elec.
Co., 107 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1997). Disobedience of court orders has
been held to be enough to show fault when courts are applying sanctions
for spoliation. Virtual Vision v. Praegitzer Indus., 124 F.3d 1140, 1144
(9th Cir. 1997). In Virtual Vision, the Ninth Circuit held that sanctions
could be issued against a bankrupt company because it had the ability to
produce relevant documents, but failed to do so. Id. It was held that
“disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the litigant is
all that is required to demonstrate willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Id.
However, negligence alone is enough to justify sanctions. In re WRT
Energy Secs. Litig., 246 F.R.D. 185, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The underlying
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rationale is that the court should give remedy to a party who suffers detriment due to the opponent’s loss of evidence and that each party should
bear the risk of its own negligence. Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at
107. Thus, gross negligence also satisfies the culpability prong of the
spoliation sanctions test. “The utter failure to establish any form of litigation hold at the outset of litigation is grossly negligent.” Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. College, 248 F.R.D. 372, 379-80 (D. Conn. 2007). In Norwalk,
the court held in 2007 that a company’s failure to cease its normal electronic document destruction policy, despite the limitations of its 50
megabyte e-mail storage capacity, was grossly negligent and deserving of
sanctions. Id.
Like the defendant company in Norwalk, Appellee was at least
grossly negligent in failing to place a litigation hold on its electronic logs
after litigation formally began. Evidencing bad faith, Appellee failed to
obey multiple court orders, like in Virtual Vision. Further, Appellee offered merely a sham replacement Data Retention Policy, a month into
litigation, after several other excuses failed. As a result, Appellee managed to avoid liability at the trial court level and to protect the identity of
LEETDUDE, which has enabled Appellee to continue operating its lucrative gaming system. Thus, this Court should conclude that Appellee, out
of monetary self-interest, either (1) anticipated litigation and destroyed
the logs so as not to become liable for the underlying claim in this action,
or else (2) continued to retain the logs pursuant to the original Data Retention Policy, subsequently destroyed the logs and proffered a sham replacement policy to cover up for its disobedience and spoliation. Either
way, Appellee’s actions and inactions satisfy the culpability prong, because they have proven that Appellee was at fault for the loss of the logs.
Therefore, Appellee is deserving of sanctions for its bad faith disobedience of court orders and spoliation of evidence.
3. Appellee’s Unproduced Logs Were Sufficiently Relevant to the
Underlying Claim, Frustrating Appellant’s Ability to Add a CoDefendant in This Litigation
The final element in spoliation sanctions analysis is that the destroyed evidence must be relevant to the proponent’s claims. Sampson,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53003, at *18. This inquiry “is unavoidably imperfect, inasmuch as, in the absence of the destroyed evidence, we can
only venture guesses with varying degrees of confidence as to what that
missing evidence may have revealed.” Kronisch v. United States, 150
F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir. 1998). To aid this imperfect inquiry, courts use a
sliding scale of culpability to determine whether lost evidence would
have been relevant to a spoliation claim. When documents are lost or
destroyed in bad faith, the bad faith destruction by itself is enough to
establish that the destroyed documents were relevant. Thompson, 219
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F.R.D. at 101. For example, the Southern District of New York has held
that “long-term and purposeful evasion of discovery requests give rise to
an inference that the evidence sought would be unfavorable to [the spoliator], in satisfaction of this relevance prong.” Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld, No. 99 Civ. 3200, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1824, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 11, 2008). The reasoning behind this presumption is that a party
would not have acted in bad faith or purposely evaded discovery requests
unless the evidence was unfavorable to the spoliator and relevant to the
case. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir.
1995).
On the other end of the sliding scale, courts have determined that
when destruction of evidence is negligent or grossly negligent, the proponent of sanctions must prove that the evidence is relevant to their case.
Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 101. The standard for showing relevance for
the purpose of this prong requires more than the “any tendency” test
under the MRCP for admissible, relevant evidence generally. 12 The
United States District Court for the District of Colorado held that “[t]he
burden is on the aggrieved party to establish a reasonable possibility,
based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination, that access
to the lost material would have produced evidence favorable to his
cause.” Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90,
104 (D. Colo. 1996). However, the Second Circuit has directed that
“courts must take care not to hold the prejudiced party to too strict a
standard of proof” because doing so would defeat the purpose of sanctions
and “allow parties who have destroyed evidence to profit from that destruction.” Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 109 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The server authentication logs that Appellee is unable to produce
would have contained evidence favorable to Appellant’s case, sufficient to
meet this relevance prong even under the more stringent test which assumes Appellee was merely negligent in losing the logs. LEETDUDE
was intended to be a co-defendant to Appellee in the present litigation
and the server authentication logs would have provided the identity of
LEETDUDE. The concrete proof of this connection is twofold. First, the
screen shots taken by LEETDUDE show that LEETDUDE was active on
the Eden game server when the shots were taken sometime in November
2007. Second, both of Appellee’s Data Retention Policies say that the
logs are used for “diagnosing customer issues as well as tracking server
utilization.” (R. at 13.) Thus, LEETDUDE’s activity would have been
tracked by the logs, and his IP address and identity would be contained
12. MRCP 401 states that evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 401.
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on the November logs that existed after the duty to preserve arose. Because the unavailability of these logs forecloses Appellant from gaining
complete judicial relief against Appellee and co-defendant LEETDUDE
for their contributions to the invasion of Appellant’s privacy, the logs are
clearly relevant in supporting Appellant’s underlying claim, even under
the more stringent test which assumes Appellee’s loss of the logs was
merely negligent.
However, this Court should find that Appellee’s inability to produce
the logs is because of Appellee’s bad faith destruction of the logs in order
to avoid liability, to protect its customer, LEETDUDE, from liability, and
to escape the consequences of setting precedent against the online gaming industry. In such a case, this Court should presume that the logs
were destroyed because they would have been favorable, and thus relevant, to this litigation. Under either the bad faith or negligence test, the
lower court should have awarded sanctions against Appellee for its actions. By ignoring clear factual support for sanctions under both tests,
the lower court abused its discretion by refusing to impose sanctions.
B. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE AND
JUSTICE DEMAND THE AWARD OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TAKING APPELLEE’S LIABILITY AS ESTABLISHED
“The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. . . . The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure
of all the facts within the framework of the rules of evidence.” Update
Art, Inc. v. Modin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 209 (1974)). Because of the need to
foster the development of relevant facts in the discovery process, severe
sanctions can be appropriate when parties do not comply with discovery
requests and orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Although sanctions such as
default judgment and adverse inference are “harsh medicine that should
not be administered lightly,” no lesser sanctions suffice in the case before
this Court to meet the underlying policies of spoliation sanctions. Griffin
Grading & Clearing, Inc. v. Tire Serv. Equip. Mfg. Co., 334 S.C. 193, 197
(S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
The Supreme Court has twice directed that even the most severe
sanctions under MRCP 37(b) “must be applied diligently both ‘to penalize
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, and to
deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such
a deterrent.’ ” Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763 (1980)
(quoting NHL v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). Moreover, the circuit courts have encouraged the application of these sanctions
to restore the evidentiary balance between parties and to prevent the
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innocent party from losing on the merits while the bad faith litigant is
unjustly enriched. See Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108. In the instant case, no sanction less than default judgment or taking Appellee’s
liability as established in the underlying claim will sufficiently serve
these purposes of punishment, deterrence and justice.
1. No Sanction Less Than Taking Appellee’s Liability as Established
Will Sufficiently Punish and Specifically Deter Appellee From
Discovery Abuse
Default judgment or taking liability as established is necessary to
serve as a specific deterrent, to punish Appellee for its conduct and thus
dissuade Appellee from abusing the discovery process in the future. The
courts have an obligation to prevent unjust enrichment. “[H]owever innocent a failure to provide discovery may be, it is fundamental that a
party that does not provide discovery cannot profit from its own failure.”
Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Based on factual
findings supported by the record, a court may “sanction conduct that is
disrespectful to the court and deter similar misconduct in the future.”
Webb v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
In the instant case, the lower court permitted Appellee to profit both
in the lawsuit and in its business, from the loss of the authentication
logs. Appellee created an online game and contractually guaranteed subscribers a right to privacy within that game. It then reneged on the contract and enabled select subscribers to tortiously invade that privacy for
the purpose of profit. Appellee, when brought before the court for these
actions, rebuffed the court’s request for discovery two separate times,
and when the court ordered it to show cause or suffer the consequences it
responded with an altered document destruction policy. If Appellee is
permitted to flout discovery requests and profit monetarily, it will have
no reason not to act similarly in the future. This is unacceptable according to the D.C. Circuit and must be remedied with default judgment or
taking liability as established.
2. General Deterrence Supports the Award of Nothing Less Than a
Strong Sanction Against Appellee
In order to send a message to future litigants, this Court must
award a default judgment or take Appellee’s liability as proven in order
to establish a general deterrent from future disobedient or negligent destruction of electronically stored information. These specific sanctions
would also promote respect for the judicial process, the court’s time, and
dignity of the adversarial process. The Supreme Court has held that leniency in such matters would cause “other parties to other lawsuits to
feel freer than . . . Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other
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discovery orders of other District Courts.” NHL, 427 U.S. at 643. The
overall goal of sanctions is not just to punish the offending party, but to
deter those who may engage in the conduct without the absence of a deterrent. NHL, 427 U.S. at 643. If parties are allowed to ignore their
discovery obligations, the effect will be to make judges supervise every
step of the discovery process, a result that is contrary to the goals of the
discovery rules. Dellums, 566 F.2d at 235.
In this case, it is particularly important for this Court to award a
strong sanction, such as default judgment, and continue to develop the
growing interpretation of the new electronic discovery amendments to
the MRCP. With the amount of electronically stored information increasing daily, it becomes easier and more profitable for bad faith litigants to lose information, unless there is a severe penalty which will
prevent that discovery abuse and promote active preservation of relevant
data. Every time relevant documents are negligently or willfully destroyed, the court is one step further from uncovering the truth and rendering justice. A strong sanction of default judgment or taking liability
as established would aid judicial efficiency throughout the State of Marshall by putting potential litigants on notice that electronic discovery obligations are real and are being enforced.
3. The Concepts of Eliminating Prejudice and Restoring Justice to the
Innocent Party Necessitate an Award of Default Judgment or
Taking Appellee’s Liability as Established
The Second Circuit has expressly noted that one of the main purposes of applying sanctions against a spoliator is “to restore the
prejudiced party to the place he would have been absent the spoliation of
evidence.” West, 167 F.3d at 779. Courts find prejudice when “the lost
evidence prevents the aggrieved party from using evidence essential to
its underlying claim. Langley, 107 F.3d at 515. Thus, to remedy a finding of prejudice, courts have found that sanctions can be “a necessary
mechanism for restoring the evidentiary balance.” Residential Funding,
306 F.3d 99, 108 (reversing the district court’s denial of sanctions for this
reason). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “our system of
discovery was designed to increase the likelihood that justice will be
served in each case, not to promote principles of gamesmanship and deception in which the person who hides the ball most effectively wins.”
Abrahamsen v. Trans-State Express, Inc., 92 F.3d 425, 428-29 (6th Cir.
1996).
Appellee’s refusal to produce the server authentication logs has seriously prejudiced Appellant by foreclosing the possibility of Appellant
joining LEETDUDE as a co-defendant in this litigation and thus weakening Appellant’s third-party liability theory against Appellee. To re-
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store the evidentiary balance and to fully compensate Appellant for the
underlying tort, it is necessary to either (1) enter default judgment so
that it is ensured that Appellant gains full restitution despite the loss of
the discovery materials, or (2) in the alternative, enter an order directing
that Appellee’s participation in the invasions of privacy be taken as established so that Appellee does not benefit from its own spoliation.
C. RULE 37(E)’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISION PROVIDES NO REFUGE
APPELLEE’S BAD FAITH DISCOVERY CONDUCT

FOR

On December 1, 2006, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules unveiled the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to electronic discovery. The Committee specifically addressed
features of electronic information systems that have no counterpart in
hard-copy documents and added a new rule concerning spoliation sanctions under MRCP 37(e). 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s
note. The new rule provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine,
good faith operation of an electronic information system.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(e).
Although early commentators dubbed this provision a “safe harbor,”
subsequent comment and case law interpretation have proven this title
to be ill-suited. Kenneth J. Withers, We’ve Moved the Two Tiers and Filled in the Safe Harbor, 52 Fed. Law 50 (Nov./Dec. 2005). Rather than
broadly protect litigants for loss of electronic evidence, the rule has been
used as a firm standard of conduct, while anything less is in danger of
sanctions. Id. (attributing the analogy to Jonathan Redgrave, chair of
The Sedona Conference’s Working Group on Electronic Production, saying that there is no safe harbor—but there is a lighthouse). Thus, litigants who lose electronic evidence are subject to sanctions under the
rules as amended, when the proponent can show just one of the following
points: 1) the loss was not in good faith, 2) the loss was not within the
routine operation of the system, or 3) that exceptional circumstances
warrant sanction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
1. Because Appellee’s Actions Were Not in Good Faith, Appellee is Not
Protected by Rule 37(e)
For MRCP 37(e) to protect litigants from sanctions, the rule requires
that the litigants acted in good faith. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). The Advisory
13. When this rule was created in 2006 it was designated as Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(f). Four
months later, in 2007, the section was changed to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). Accordingly, this
brief will refer to the rule under its current title, and edit references in analytical materials
to reflect the structural change.
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Committee notes accompanying the rule state that, “when a party is
under a duty to preserve information because of pending or reasonably
anticipated litigation, intervention in the routine operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a litigation hold.” Id.
at advisory committee’s note. To take advantage of the good faith exception, a party needs to act affirmatively to prevent the system from destroying or altering information, even if such destruction would occur in
the regular course of business. Norwalk, 248 F.R.D. at 378 (holding that
failure to prevent routine deletions precluded defendants from taking advantage of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)’s good faith exception). The requirement
of good faith means “that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine
operation of an information system to thwart discovery obligations by
allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it is required to preserve.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory
committee’s note; accord Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.D.C.
2007).
When Appellee was served Appellant’s complaint on December 27,
2007, Appellee had an affirmative obligation under the MRCP 37(e) and
interpreting federal case law to put a stop to its routine destruction of
the game server logs, according to Norwalk. At no point in the record
does Appellee indicate that it put any sort of litigation hold on any routine document destruction. To the contrary, Appellee released a statement on February 2, 2008, more than one month into the litigation, that
its Data Retention Policy had been changed and only server logs from the
previous two months were going to be saved. This is a clear demonstration of Appellee’s lack of the good faith needed to take advantage of the
safe harbor provided by MRCP 37(e).
2. Because Appellee’s Logs Were Not Lost During Routine System
Operation, Appellee is Not Protected by Rule 37(e)
Generally, courts will not punish a litigant for evidence destroyed in
good faith pursuant to an organization’s legitimate data retention policy.
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention
Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 Fordham J. Corp.
& Fin. L. 721, 728 (2003) [hereinafter Chase]. However, such a policy
must have a distinct reason and purpose, “as opposed to a sham policy
created to destroy unfavorable evidence in anticipation of litigation.” Id.
For example, in a wrongful death action against an aircraft corporation,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that
where the corporation could not prove that its document destruction policy was routine instead of a sham, a default judgment was the appropriate remedy. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 485-86
(S.D. Fla. 1984). Another indication of a sham policy is when the policy
is changed after litigation has commenced. “Such policies should be cre-
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ated in advance of document destruction or during a neutral time without litigation.” Chase, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. at 724.
Like the defendants in the Carlucci case, Appellee has not presented
any evidence that Appellee’s document destruction policy was routine,
which precludes the protection of MRCP 37(e)’s safe harbor and warrants default judgment. Instead, the record proves that Appellee’s Data
Retention Policy was a sham, created months after litigation began only
to hide behind MRCP 37(e). Appellee’s Data Retention Policy that was in
effect until February 2008, months into the litigation, said only that
“older logs may be pruned.” (R. at 14.) This general statement cannot be
considered a routine. It was not until over a month into the present litigation and three motions to compel that Appellee claimed to have any
sort of routine destruction policy for its server authentication logs. This
Court would be setting dangerous precedent by permitting Appellee and
future corporations to change their document retention policies in the
middle of litigation, because it lets defendants tailor their own safe harbor to avoid liability for destroying the smoking gun. Because Appellee’s
destruction of the logs was not pursuant to a routine policy, as case law
has contemplated, Appellee is not protected by MRCP 37(e)’s safe harbor
and default judgment is warranted.
3. Because the Circumstances in This Case are Exceptional, Appellee
is Not Protected by Rule 37(e)
Even if this Court finds that Appellee’s loss of evidence was routine
and in good faith, this Court should still award sanctions under MRCP
37 because of the exception to the safe harbor provision. The drafters of
the new MRCP 37(e) specifically crafted an exception, beginning the safe
harbor rule with the phrase “absent exceptional circumstances.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(e). This exception left courts flexibility in determining that
sanctions were necessary, even when good faith and routine system operation were found. Other courts have held that when evidence is crucial
enough to a party’s case, the reason for the loss of evidence does not negate the prejudicial impact. See Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108.
Where spoliation is prejudicial and substantially denies the other party
the ability to prosecute or defend a claim, intentional, negligent and even
inadvertent spoliation of evidence may justify adverse judgment. Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 589.
Here, Appellant has been prejudiced by Appellee’s loss of the logs,
despite a duty to preserve them, because Appellee is consequently unable
to join LEETDUDE as a co-defendant in order to seek full restitution on
the invasion of privacy claim. Because the prejudice in this case is
unique to the progressive application of traditional tort law to the virtual
world, Appellant’s circumstances are, indeed, exceptional. Therefore, if
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this Court finds that the safe harbor provision would apply to Appellee in
all other regards, then this Court should still render a finding that due to
the exceptional nature of this litigation and the unique way in which
Appellee has thwarted discovery and hence Appellant’s full restitution,
either default judgment or taking Appellee’s liability as established is
the only acceptable remedy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests this Honorable Court REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals for the State of
Marshall for the Fourth Circuit, and hold that Appellant is entitled to
judicial relief from Appellee’s invasion of privacy and spoliation of
evidence.
Respectfully Submitted,

Counsel for Petitioner
Date: September 26, 2008
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APPENDIX A
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in
Discovery; Sanctions.
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.
(2) Appropriate Court. A motion for an order to a party must be made
in the court where the action is pending. A motion for an order to a nonparty must be made in the court where the discovery is or will be taken.
(3) Specific Motions.
(A) To Compel Disclosure. If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and
for appropriate sanctions.
(B) To Compel a Discovery Response. A party seeking discovery
may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or
inspection. This motion may be made if:
(i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or
31;
(ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4);
(iii) a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule
33; or
(iv) a party fails to respond that inspection will be permitted—or
fails to permit inspection—as requested under Rule 34.
(C) Related to a Deposition. When taking an oral deposition, the
party asking a question may complete or adjourn the examination before
moving for an order.
(4) Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Response. For purposes of this subdivision (a), an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer,
or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.
(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is Provided After Filing). If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must,
after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent
whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising
that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred
in making the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not
order this payment if:
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(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to
obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;
(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was
substantially justified; or
(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(B) If the Motion Is Denied. If the motion is denied, the court may
issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and must, after
giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who opposed the
motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not order this payment if the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
(C) If the Motion Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part. If the
motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may issue any
protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after giving an
opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the
motion.
(b) Failure to Comply with a Court Order.
(1) Sanctions in the District Where the Deposition Is Taken. If the
court where the discovery is taken orders a deponent to be sworn or to
answer a question and the deponent fails to obey, the failure may be
treated as contempt of court.
(2) Sanctions in the District Where the Action Is Pending.
(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order. If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent—or a witness designated under Rule
30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the
action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the
following:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in
evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
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(B) For Not Producing a Person for Examination. If a party fails to
comply with an order under Rule 35(a) requiring it to produce another
person for examination, the court may issue any of the orders listed in
Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), unless the disobedient party shows that it cannot
produce the other person.
(C) Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the orders
above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising
that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s
fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified
or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is
not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the
court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the
orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
(2) Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit what is requested
under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves a document to be
genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may move that the
party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in making that proof. The court must so order unless:
(A) the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a);
(B) the admission sought was of no substantial importance;
(C) the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe
that it might prevail on the matter; or
(D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Party’s Failure to Attend Its Own Deposition, Serve Answers to Interrogatories, or Respond to a Request for Inspection.
(1) In General.
(A) Motion; Grounds for Sanctions. The court where the action is
pending may, on motion, order sanctions if:
(i) a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent—or a
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails, after being
served with proper notice, to appear for that person’s deposition; or
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(ii) a party, after being properly served with interrogatories under
Rule 33 or a request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.
(B) Certification. A motion for sanctions for failing to answer or
respond must include a certification that the movant has in good faith
conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to act in an effort
to obtain the answer or response without court action.
(2) Unacceptable Excuse for Failing to Act. A failure described in
Rule 37(d)(1)(A) is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought
was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion
for a protective order under Rule 26(c).
(3) Types of Sanctions. Sanctions may include any of the orders
listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). Instead of or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules
on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system.
(f) Failure to Participate in Framing a Discovery Plan. If a party or its
attorney fails to participate in good faith in developing and submitting a
proposed discovery plan as required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after
giving an opportunity to be heard, require that party or attorney to pay
to any other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,
caused by the failure.
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APPENDIX B
FED. R. EVID. 401. Definition of Relevant Evidence.
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
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